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Introduction 
Since the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the considerable scrutiny 
of the new Iraqi constitution has focused on the issues of sectarianism and 
political centralization. However, other areas of tension are also evident. 
In particular, the issues of gender equality and religious freedom are crucial 
areas for discussion, particularly in the context of the broader discourse of 
Islam and human rights. Gender equality and religious freedom are the 
two most contested areas of debate between advocates of the universal 
human rights regime and those seeking to develop and infuse an Islamic 
perspective on human rights. The debates concerning these issues in the 
formation of the new Iraqi constitution provide an illustrative example of 
possible compromise between perspectives that are often posited as mutually 
exclusive. 
Gender equality is under stress in the new Iraqi constitution, but a 
visible civil society movement champions it both domestically and 
internationally with clear precedents for the reconciliation of Islam and 
international human rights standards. Religious freedom, particularly the 
right of Muslims to convert to other religions or adopt a secular lifestyle, 
is also under pressure. Here, there is room for the opening of dialogue to 
protect those who want to convert from Islam through radical reformist 
discourse on religious freedom and human rights in Islam whilst maintaining 
the Islamic character of the constitution. However, this debate is hampered 
by the ethnic/identity overtones of this debate in the country, particularly 
in the early stages of power acquisition after the fall of the Saddam regime. 
Also, the issue of religious freedom in terms of apostasy does not have the 
support of visible and active civil society movements as is the case with 
those who support strengthening gender equality in Iraq. 
The Iraqi constitution takes important steps in terms of enshrining 
rights on gender equality and religious freedom in Iraq. However, there are 
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serious weaknesses in the document in terms of the potential abandonment 
of personal status laws in favor of community and sectarian law. In addition, 
the constitution does not recognize the links between political status and 
religious freedom. The debate concerning the place of human rights in the 
constitution needs to work from a position of critical engagement with 
both Islamic approaches to human rights and the international rights regime 
in order to enshrine a series of rights for Iraqis that are both legitimate and 
resilient. 
Islam and human rights 
The debate surrounding Islam and human rights centers on the applicability 
of human rights in non-Western contexts (Berween 2003: 129). Implicit in 
this is the idea amongst a number of Islamic scholars and activists that 
human rights, as articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are largely a product of "Western'' historical 
experiences. Consequently, the discussion has centered on the applicability 
of human rights to Islamic societies. This is not to posit a homogenous 
discourse, but this general sketch does peg the broad parameters of debate. 
Within this, there is a wide range of positions as to the validity of human 
rights norms is Islamic societies. Four main approaches to this issue can 
be identified: an "Islamization" of human rights; pragmatic reforms 
within the framework of the shari' a; critical reconceptualization of the 
shari'a; and political secularism in Islam (Bielefeldt 2000).The first 
position, a "status qud' or "traditionalist" stance, does not critically engage 
with the details of the human rights regime, instead it simply denies 
the issue any controversy. That is, proponents of this view claim that 
there is no necessity for a critical debate as 'human rights have always 
been recognized in the shari'a', thus, it provides an absolute and final 
blueprint for a human rights program (Bielefeldt 2000: 103-4). 
Conceptually, this approach found its contemporary voice through the 
work of Abul A' la Moudoudi and his proposition that the non-discriminatory 
nature of Islam provides the ideal basis for respect for human rights 
(Maudoudi 1988). 
More recently, the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) has 
given specific voice to this perspective through the Cairo Declaration 
on Human Rights in Islam. The Cairo Declaration, released at the 
OIC summit on 5 August 1990, states from the very outset that humans 
are bound through 'their subordination to Allah' and Islam 'is the 
guarantee for enhancing ... dignity along the path to human integrity' 
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(OIC 1990: Article 1-a). Thus, it is fraternity through religion that provides 
the basis for the bestowal of human rights. 
Despite the inclusion of a range of tenets akin to those in the UDHR, 
the Cairo Declaration contains key differences that show how it lacks any 
critical engagement with human rights discourse. The most prominent of 
these lie at the end of the document which state, respectively, that 'all 
rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the 
Islamic shari' a' and 'the Islamic shari' a is the only source of"reference for 
the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration' 
(OIC 1990: Articles 24-5). Thus, the Cairo Declaration does not critically 
engage with the global human rights regime as enshrined in the UDHR, 
instead, simply claiming that Islamic doctrine is complete in its perspec-
tives on human rights issues. As such, the traditionalist stance on the Islam 
and human rights debate offers little in terms of promoting cross-cultural 
understanding. 
The second categorization is one prominent in Muslim societies 
globally, what Bielefeldt describes as consistent with the 'tradition of 
humanitarian pragmatism' even though 'conceptual differences between 
shari 'a and human rights may yet remain unsettled' (Bielefeldt 2000: 
106). This pragmatism has centered on the difference between theory and 
practice in the implementation of, for instance, hudd punishments 
(Schacht 1964: 120). This approach has manifested itself not so much in 
prominent Muslim intellectual thought, but instead through state practice 
over several centuries. For instance, the legitimacy of polygamy has 
remained but authorities within the vast majority of Muslim communities 
have discouraged its practice. Such changes generally take several generations 
to take shape and are organic in that the necessity for reform stems from 
circumstance rather than ideology. 
Departing from these perspectives, the radical reformist approach to the 
debate concerning Islam and human rights seeks to engage in a 'courageous 
and frank criticism' of the shari'a that leads not to a dismissal of Islamic 
law but its reappraisal in the contemporary global environment (Bielefeldt 
2000: 108). This is a process, described by Rahman, as an acceptance of 
'existing society as a term of reference' in the understanding and application 
of Islamic law (Rahman 1966: 136). This approach has primarily sought 
to attenuate the tendency to equate shari' a strictly with traditional 
jurisprudence (fiqh ), emphasizing it as an 'ethical and religious concept 
rather than a legalistic one' (Bielefeldt 2000: 108). Such an approach is 
illustrated in the work of prominent reformist scholar, the Sudanese academic 
Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im. An-Na'im proposes a new hermeneutic 
approach to understanding the Qur' an and the shari' a that differentiates 
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between the earlier revelations in Mecca and the latter revelations in Medina. 
The core of An-Na 'im's approach proposes that the earlier revelations 
(in Mecca) contain the core theological messages of Islam while the latter, 
which are more elaborate and legalistic, are more responsive to the specific 
historical circumstances of the time (An-Na 'im 1990: 54). Whilst not 
contesting the 'divine character' of these latter revelations, they need to be 
viewed in their historical context (Bielefeldt 2000: 110). 
This differentiation serves as a mechanism by which certain Islamic 
principles act as immutable values whilst others serve as 'examples of an 
Islamic way of life within a particular historic context' that can be interpreted 
and applied by Muslims in changed historical circumstances (Bielefeldt 
2000: 110). Such an approach serves as a blueprint for many radical 
reformists in the Muslim community in their efforts to develop alternative 
interpretations of Islamic law that can constructively and critically engage 
with the human rights regime. Indeed, such an approach has gained 
increasing currency amongst civil society groups throughout the Muslim 
world in their efforts to promote political reform that is grounded in 
a local context whilst also being responsive to global norms. 
The final position in this typology is that of political secularism. This is 
not to be confused with "ideological secularism" that seeks to remove religion 
from the public arena. Instead, this approach argues that it is possible to 
differentiate between the prophetic and political roles of the Prophet 
Muhammad, whereby the religious and the political themselves can be 
separated. This perspective has received little currency amongst Muslim 
communities, but has been championed in small pockets of the 
Muslim intelligentsia. Central to this argument is an objection to the use of 
religion to validate temporal political activity; an act they argue is akin to 
idolatry. Instead, humans must accept their finite circumstance and not 
'instrumentalize' religion for 'the purposes of power politics' (Bielefeldt 
2000: 113~4). An implicit form of this can be seen to resonate in the Arab 
Middle East where the idea of cultural unity through Islamic identity has 
been promoted through secular political systems based on civil law codes. 
This was particularly prominent up to the 1970s and 1980s in states such 
as Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq. 
This typology is useful as it gives nuance to the debate concerning 
Islam and human rights. However, it is important to see how such approaches 
manifest themselves in relation to specific events. The formation of the post-
Saddam era constitution in Iraq provides such an opportunity, particularly 
in terms of the activities of radical reformist groups and their efforts to 
promote a reformist agenda on key human rights issues. Two such issues 
sit at the centre of this debate concerning, those of gender rights and 
56 Benjamin MacQueen and Shahram Akbarzadeh 
religious freedom. These two are key points of tension as they present 
apparently immutable areas in terms of compromise between Islam and human 
rights. Thus, before turning to the case study it is important to outline the 
tension surrounding the issues of gender rights and religious freedom. 
Overlapping universalities? 
The issues of gender equality and religious freedom are key points of 
debate on Islam and human rights as they involve the most difficult areas 
of mutual accommodation (Brems 2004: 18). The challenge rests in the 
"inclusive universality" of both systems. The international human rights 
regime has effectively set the parameters of what is acceptable and what 
is not. In contrast, Islam also contains clear injunctions on the halal and 
the haram. Both systems regard their ideological parameters as set and 
internally consistent. The question is, therefore, whether there is an overlap 
between these systems which claim universality. 
The UDHR and ICESCR are both unequivocal in their outline of gender 
equality. The UDHR states, in Article 2, that 'everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of 
any kind, such as ... sex' and the ICESCR states, in Article 3, that state 
parties must 'ensure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all economic, social and cultural rights'. However, there is intense 
disagreement within Islamic scholarship over the status of women as 
accorded by the Qur' an and the shari' a. Many 'ulama and jurists claim 
that women have been given a subordinate status to men whilst 'modernists' 
in Islamic scholarship believe that 'the holy book accords equal status to 
both sexes' (Engineer 2004: 1). 
In order to explore the Islamic position it is helpful to break down the 
issue of gender quality into a series of elements which make up the stance 
of the Qur' an and the shari' a. In terms of human dignity, there is minimal 
disagreement over the equality of the sexes. Central to this is the declaration 
in the Qur'an that all humans were created from a 'single soul' (4:1), thus 
no gender implicitly enjoys superiority over the other. This is compounded 
by many other Qur' anic references that focus on the equality of all 
humankind, regardless of gender. However, moving beyond this basic element, 
the idea of absolute equality becomes more problematic when the concept 
of gender complementarity is introduced. In particular, the idea of gender 
complementarity relates to the specific social functions of men and 
women rather than dignity or religious status (William & Chrisman 1993 ). 
Debates concerning gender rights are not new in Muslim societies, but 
have been pronounced particularly at times of rapid social change. In terms 
of the contemporary debate, there has been significant attention on what 
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Deniz Kandiyoti identifies as 'Muslim women as the bearers of the 
''backwardness" of their societies' in the eyes of Western observers and 
Western-oriented reformers (Kandiyoti in Afkhami 1995: 20-1). This is 
a process that often inspires local reaction whereby certain social and 
cultural practices relating to gender rights and restrictions are elevated 
'into symbols of cultural authenticity and integrity' (Kandiyoti in Afkhami 
1995: 21; see also Ahmed 1992). Advocates of women's rights in Muslim 
countries have typically struggled to gain both resources and recognition 
for their efforts (Kandiyoti in Afkhami 1995: 26). This weakness stems, in 
part, from the broad range of views within the discourses on women's 
rights in Islam. The diversity of Muslim opinions in Iraq reflects the 
breadth of debates at the regional level between secular feminists, 
reformists, to 'Islamist women who fully endorse the dictates of the 
shari'a' (Kandiyoti inAfkhami 1995: 26). 
Similar to gender equality, international human rights mechanisms are 
clear in their assertion of religious freedom in terms of the right to prac-
tice and convert. Article 18 of the UDHR states that: 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance. 
This is echoed in Article 18 of the ICCPR which adds that 'no one shall 
be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice'. Article 27 of the ICCPR states that minority 
communities 'shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language'. 
The statement within Article 18 of the UDHR concerning the right to 
'change ... religion or belief' is of primary importance here as it touches on 
the controversial area of apostasy in Islam. Saeed and Saeed contend that 
the right to religious freedom 'is perhaps the oldest human right recognized 
internationally' (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 10). However, such freedom is seen 
as violating the tenets relating to apostasy in Islam. This provides an area 
of heated discussion as the treatment of apostasy 'has not differed essentially 
from its conceptualization in the second century of Islam' to the present time 
(Saeed & Saeed 2004: 1). It is an immutable law, and one that prescribes 
the harshest of hudd punishments. 
The scale of punishments is contested among Muslim scholars, as it is 
based not on Qur'anic law but on the traditions of the Prophet (hadith) 
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(Saeed & Saeed 2004: 2). The debate within Islam over apostasy centers 
on the severity of punishments, not the illegality of the act. Some scholars 
claim that there is no Qur' anic basis for the application of the death 
penalty for apostasy and, in addition, that freedom of religion is a basic 
principle of Islam (Al-Naqib 1997: 595). Saeed and Saeed argue that capital 
punishment for apostasy was originally limited to acts of high treason, but 
has been hijacked subsequently by those seeking to apply it to conversion 
from or renunciation of Islam (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 2-3). .. 
Prior to the emergence of international norms enshrined through the 
UN, religious freedom in Islam acknowledged the "people of the book" 
(Jews and Christians) who are regarded as the recipients of early revelations 
in the form of the sacred texts. Judaism and Christianity, both monotheistic, 
have more in common with Islam than other religions and are, therefore, 
privileged. The Islamic notion of freedom of religion was traditionally 
applied to "revealed religions." Historically (particularly prior to WWI), 
Muslim rulers demonstrated a far greater degree of tolerance to all religions 
than warranted in Islamic law for political expediency. The deciding factor 
for Muslim rulers was whether their subjects were law-abiding and pledged 
loyalty to their authority. This contractual system assured a significant 
degree of social harmony and averted internal strife, allowing religious 
freedom to non-Muslims in pre-modern times (Lapidus 2002: 197-217). 
With the advent of the nation-state system, most states with Muslim 
majorities have developed constitutions that, de Jure, allow religious 
pluralism without discrimination. 
However, neither the core Islamic texts nor the constitutions of many 
modern Muslim states deal explicitly with the conversion of Muslims to 
another religion. The OIC declarations on human rights, particularly 
the Cairo Declaration, echoes this by not giving the specific right of an 
individual to leave Islam but only granting the right of individuals to have 
'religious freedom' (OIC 1990: Articles 10, 22a, 22b). Religious freedom 
in the Cairo Declaration is more concerned with the protection for 
Muslims in the face of increased Christian evangelical and missionary 
activity than a concession for the freedom to convert from Islam or practice 
Islam according to local custom. 
In terms of intellectual approaches, three perspectives have emerged. 
First, the pre-modern position of no conversion from Islam with the 
penalty of death for apostasy; second, the use of this system with some 
form of limitations; and third, the total freedom 'to move to and from 
Islam' (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 88). The first position is dominant amongst 
Muslim scholars and thus allows no room for accommodation of Article 
18 of the UDHR. The second position, evident in the work of scholars 
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such as Moudoudi, is that the punishment must stand but that the declaration 
of apostasy must come from the state. That is, to turn ones back on Islam 
in a Muslim political community is tantamount to treason, thus deserving 
of capital punishment administered by the state. The third perspective 
corresponds to the position taken by radical reformers and secular 
Muslims. The radical reformist position takes issue with the religious legal 
basis for the penalty, arguing that either the death penalty for apostasy is 
not outlined in the Qur'an, and the apostate will be judged upon their 
natural death (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 94-5). Opposition to the death penalty 
is central to the secular perspective. This stems from a call for the 
imposition of a civil law code that would protect freedom of religion. 
The invasion of Iraq and the 
post-Saddam Iraqi constitution 
Bearing this debate in mine.\ discourses concerning human rights in Islam 
acquired significant relevance beyond academic discourse following the 
fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The state-building project in the 
post-Saddam era opened up the political arena to a full range of players 
subscribing to very diverse ideologies. In this context, the articulation 
of the new Iraqi constitution has been a critical test of the ability of 
various forces to converge over the role of Islam in Iraqi public life, and 
particularly its position vis-a-vis gender equality and religious freedom. 
However, the continuing instability in Iraq, along with the efforts of 
conservative elites to pursue their agenda, one often backed by the 
occupying forces as they enlist their support to enhance Iraq's security 
prospects, places the future of gender equality and religious freedom in 
Iraq at risk. 
Gender rights and religious 
freedom under Saddam Hussein 
The situation for women and minority religious communities under the 
regime of Saddam Hussein is a contested subject. Secular personal status 
laws up to the 1990s governed both areas. Iraqi laws on religious freedom 
and gender equality were based on the 1959 Personal Status Law. 
According to the international solidarity network, Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws (WMULM), this was 'one of the most progressive family 
laws in the Middle East' (WL UML 2005). This law was updated in 1970 with 
a new constitution. Article 19 of the 1970 Iraqi Provisional Constitution 
guaranteed equal gender rights by civil law. The new constitution and its 
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protection of gender equality came into force following the seizure of 
power by the Ba' ath Party in 1968. 
The status of women was further affected when the government-
sponsored General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) replaced women's 
civil society groups that existed before the coup (such as the Women's 
Empowerment Society, the Kurdish Women's Association, and the Iraqi 
Women's League) (HRW 2003: 1). The GFIW facilitated the training of 
women for placement in various spheres such as industry, public service, 
and agriculture. This move stemmed from the labor shortage faced by the 
new regime due to successive wars. Gender equality was an important part 
in encouraging women to join the workforce. This was a deliberate attempt 
to tap into the potential pool of an industrial labor force and political base 
that women represented. 
The expansion of women's rights in Iraq at this time to promote state-led 
development is a pattern that is repeated in many Muslim states. The 
necessity of mobilizing women's labor as well as using the image of 
women's labor force participation as a sign of social progress has framed 
the efforts at women's emancipation in countries such as Egypt, Syria, 
Tunisia as well as Iraq (Kandiyoti in Afkhami 1995: 22). Ironically, the 
increased rates of women's participation in the labor force, the professional 
sphere and in political life has been the source of a conservative backlash 
within Muslim societies, particularly in times of economic recession and 
high male unemployment (Mernissi 1988: 8-11). This backlash became 
public in the constitutional debate of the post-Saddam era. 
The Ba' ath regime, however was undeniably repressive and intolerant 
of dissent. State sanctions against religious and ethnic communities, 
dissidents and intellectuals also affected women (HRW 2003: 1). Women's 
conditions suffered a blow in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War which 
brought UN sanctions on Iraq. In the 1990s the ruling regime was under 
siege and obsessed with its survival. This led the regime to buttress its 
legitimacy by seeking to 'embrace Islamic and tribal traditions as a political 
tool in order to consolidate power' (HRW 2003: 3-4). This reinforced the 
patterns that undermined the status of women. An unintended consequence 
of the sanctions was the retraction of state services for women, particularly 
education. For instance, as school places shrunk, families focused on 
granting access for boys ahead of girls (HRW 2003: 23). Therefore, whilst 
women were subject to the systemic violence of Saddam's dictatorship, 
their status was formally enshrined in civil law and they had access to full 
marriage, inheritance, employment, and other rights. Since 1991 and 
especially since 2003, there has been a notable regression in the formalized 
rights for women in Iraq, particularly in terms of the growing conservative 
religious influence in the country. 
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Invasion, occupation and human rights in Iraq 
On 11 October 2002 the United States Congress passed the "Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002," permitting 
President George W. Bush authorization to use military force if the Iraqi 
regime of Saddam Hussein was deemed to have not relinquished his 
alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Instigated by US pressure, 
the UN passed resolution 1441 on 9 November threatening 'serious 
consequences' if Iraq did not comply with previous disarmament obligations 
(United Nations 2002). 1 After intense diplomatic pressure and negotiations, 
President Bush addressed the US people on 17 March 2003 to declare 
that Iraq had not met its obligations. This declaration came despite 
protests from the Iraqi regime, the UN weapons inspection committee and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iraq had complied with the 
disarmament procedure. 
Consequently, on 20 March 2003 the United States, in cooperation with 
the United Kingdom and the so-called "coalition of the willing''2 launched 
"Operation Iraqi Freedom." The initial military operation was quick, leading 
to the fall of Baghdad on 9 April and the formal removal of Ba' ath Party 
rule on 1 May 2003. However, even with the capture of Saddam Hussein 
on 13 December 2003 the occupation forces have faced an ongoing 
resistance in the form of Ba' ath Party loyalists, Islamist insurgents, 
and other armed groups that continue to challenge the foreign military 
occupation of Iraq. 
This insurgency has sought to cripple the occupying powers and derail 
the process of political transformation instigated by the coalition forces. 
This process has made progress despite the significant armed challenge to 
its presence. In June 2004, limited sovereignty was transferred from the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the appointed caretaker government 
under Iyad Allawi. Allawi's government served until the first post-invasion 
election on 31 January 2005. This new elected body was charged with 
drafting the new constitution for post-Saddam Iraq by 15 August. After 
several delays, the draft was approved on 28 August and on 15 October 
2005 the Iraqi constitution was approved in a referendum by 16 of Iraq's 
18 provinces. Views on the significance of this moment have differed 
widely, from a dismissal of the document as enshrining division in the 
country and as a recipe for future disaster to those who see it as a triumph 
for the nascent electoral process and laying the foundations of democracy 
and prosperity in Iraq. 
The deterioration of the security situation under the American occupation 
has seen an escalation of violence against women, particularly rape and 
physical abuse. The Iraqi Ministry of Public Works and Social Affairs has 
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reported a significant increase in cases of physical and sexual abuse 
against women (WLUML 2005). The reported cases are put in stark relief 
in light of comments by various NGOs which state that these cases reflect 
only a small proportion of the overall instances of sexual and physical 
abuse. The lack of reporting of cases, it has been argued, is due to the 
threat of honor killings and pressures from the families of victims 
(WLUML 2005). In addition, there are charges against the government for 
inaction and fostering an environment conducive to the cotitinuation of 
such acts. For instance, Juan Khalaf of the National League for Women's 
Rights in Iraq has stated that 'women are being raped and sexually abused 
and instead of the government increasing our power to judge and defend 
ourselves, they are just decreasing it, trying to keep us out of politics and 
the important sectors of society' (quoted in WLUML 2005). 
The picture in relation to religious minorities was also mixed. The 
regime of Saddam Hussein conducted systematic campaigns of aggression 
toward various religious groups in the country, particularly the Shi' a 
community of Baghdad and Iraq's south. In addition, the regime also 
sought to annihilate the military capacity of the large Kurdish community 
in the north of the country. However, the status of religious minorities, 
notably the "ChaldoAssyrian" population as well as the Yezidi population 
did not suffer as a specific target of the Hussein regime's wrath. These 
communities benefited from the enshrinement of rights in Iraqi civil law. 
The tension between religious and ethnic communities in Iraq has 
heightened markedly since 2003. Outside the most notable triad of 
Shi'a-Sunni-Kurdish competition for power in the post-Saddam era, 
the promotion of shari'a law as the basis for a future Iraqi constitution has 
caused concern amongst Iraq's Christian and secular population. In addition, 
the tensions between the ChaldoAssyrian and Kurdish communities in the 
north, particularly around the mixed city of Kirkuk, has led this group to 
seek the enshrinement of religious freedom as a method for protecting 
their small community from being subsumed in larger territorial units 
within a prospective federal structure. 
Drafting the constitution 
Following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Transitional 
Authority Law (TAL), drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
was introduced on 8 March 2004 and served as the "Supreme Law of Iraq" 
until the ratification of the Iraqi constitution by referendum on 
15 October 2005 (CPA 2004). The two most prominent Iraqi participants 
in the CPA helping to draft the TAL were Faisal al-Istrabadi, a former 
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US State Department Advisor and Iraqi UN charge d'ajfaires, and Salem 
Chalabi, nephew of former pro-US Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi and head of 
the criminal tribunal charged with trying ex-President Saddam Hussein 
(Marr 2005). 
The US was heavily involved in the formulation of the TAL. This posed 
problems for the legitimacy of the law as the US sought to impose its own 
vision for what the future political structure of Iraq should look like. 
According to Noah Feldman, advisor to the CPA on the formulation of the 
TAL, the US 'did try to effect substantive outcomes in this document by 
exercising its own influence' (Plumer 2005). In this, efforts were made to 
ensure women's participation in the prospective constitutional formation 
process (Al-Marashi 2005: 139). 
The TAL set out the parameters for the drafting of the constitution by 
the Transitional National Authority (TNA) elected in January 2005. The 
30 January polls for the TNA saw the election, out of 275 seats, of 
140 members of the predominantly Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) of 
which the SCIRI was the dominant member. The Kurdish Constitutional 
List (KCL ), an alliance of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan gained 75 seats and Al-Iraqiyyun ("the Iraqis") of 
I yad Allawi gained 14 seats. The various Sunni parties gained 1 7 seats as 
a result of a widespread Sunni boycott of the poll, the Iraqi Turkmen Front 
(ITF) gained three seats and the National Mesopotamia List representing 
Iraqi Christians, gained one seat (Al-Marashi 1995: 141). This parliament 
was charged with appointing the 55 member committee which would 
draft the constitution. Members of the UIA (28) and KCL ( 15) dominated 
the Constitutional Committee (CC). The CC also contained eight 
members of Al-Iraqiyyun and four members representing the Turkmen, 
ChaldoAssyrian, and Yezidi communities. Later on, 17 new Sunni mem-
bers were appointed to the CC in an effort to promote Sunni inclusion in 
the drafting process (UN 2005: 2). The TAL provided for a 25 per cent 
quota for women's representation in parliament. There were 10 women on 
the final 72 member CC (Wong 2005). 
This drafting process was short as the constitutional drafting committee 
had less than three months to complete its task (ICGb 2005: 2). The TAL 
contained some promising provisions in relation to the issue of human rights. 
Whilst the opening articles declared the centrality of Islam to the political 
structure, Article 22 of the TAL declared that Iraqis shall 'enjoy all the 
rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including 
the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements'. At face 
value, these provisions stood in contrast to the declaratory significance of 
Islam to the post-Saddam political system. The protection of 'all rights' in 
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Article 22 seemed to suggest a modest effort to temper ideological limitations 
contained in the Constitution's preamble or apply a liberal interpretation 
of Islam. However, the Iraqi constitution that emerged in August stepped 
away from these provisions and took a woefully ambiguous position on 
gender rights and religious freedom. 
The CC had its first meeting on 24 May and set itself a 15 August deadline. 
This speedy drafting of the constitution was hoped to undermine the insur-
gency and foster a democratic process. There is broad consensus, however, 
that 'in the end, none of these goals was met' (Brown 2005c). The final 
draft was presented on 28 August but the draft itself did not achieve 
consensus on the key issues of the role of Islam as a source of law, the 
political structure of the state (namely the issue of federalism), or even the 
name of post-Saddam Iraq. The draft constitution was pushed through by 
the Kurdish and Shi' a delegates in the face of vehement objections from 
the Sunni delegation (ICGb 2005: 2). 
During the final stages of the drafting process, representatives of the 
smaller communities along with the Sunni representatives were largely 
excluded as the Shi' a and Kurdish delegations pushed ahead to produce 
a document by the August deadline (ICGb 2005: 3). The final drafting 
process took place 'behind closed doors', excluding both the Sunnis and 
the minority delegates, even those from the large blocs such as the United 
Iraqi Alliance (ICGb 2005: 3-4). This led the Sunni delegates to withdraw 
from the drafting process on 28 August, just before the final agreement 
(Cragan 2005). The completion of the constitution on 28 August came 
after a 13-day delay from the original deadline of 15 August. The draft was 
further amended on 13 September by the speaker of the National 
Assembly without the approval of the body (Brown 2005b: 1 ). However, these 
amendments (federal vs. regional control over water sources, comments 
on the identity of the Iraqi state, the application of international human 
rights treaties) were adjusted so that only minimal changes affected the 
constitution (Worth 2005). 
Efforts to rush through the drafting process were backed by the US who 
focused on the speedy completion of the draft. This was largely a response 
to the domestic pressures in the US that began to turn against the continued 
troop presence in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. As a result, the constitution 
contains a number of controversial elements. The first are the provisions 
for decentralization. For instance, the constitution allows for two governates 
(other than Baghdad) to join and form a region with the vote of a simple 
majority, as well as allowing two regions to merge into a new region. The 
status of Kirkuk, previously protected like Baghdad and prevented from 
joining other regions, was dropped from the TAL on the formation of 
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the constitution. This was a major setback for the minority groups (Turkoman, 
ChaldoAssyrian, Arab) and a major win for the Kurdish delegation 
(ICGb 2005: 6). 
The application of international human rights treaties proved to be a 
highly contested issue in drafting the constitution (ICGb 2005: 4). Some 
within the CC argued that the omission of references to international 
human rights treaties in Article 44 would actually strengthen the position 
of international human rights treaties as the article stated that they would 
be subsumed to the limits of the constitution. This was a highly suspect 
argument leading to the retention of this article in the final draft. 
Earlier drafts of the constitution envisaged a restrictive application of 
international human rights treaties in Iraq. For instance, a draft circulated 
in July 2005 stated that international human rights treaties would be 
observed in Iraq 'so long as these do not contradict Islam' (Article 22) 
(Brown 2005a: 7). This article echoes the Cairo Declaration in subsuming 
the application of human rights treaties but uses the more ambiguous 
reference to "Islam" rather than to the specificities of Islamic law. Article 
44, instead, places restrictions on the application of human rights treaties 
only if they 'run contrary to the principles and rules of (the) constitution'. 
Originally included in Article 44, this commitment to international human 
rights treaties was put up for omission in the 13 September referendum. 
The international response to the new Iraqi constitution was mixed. For 
instance, the International Crisis Group describes it as 'a weak document 
that lacks consensus ... the worst possible outcome' the product of a 'rushed 
constitutional process (that) has deepened rifts and hardened feelings', 
laying the groundwork for further sectarianism and heightening the risk 
of civil war (ICGb 2005: 1-3, parenthesis added). The European Union 
issued a measured statement in response to the constitutional drafting 
process, welcoming the 'continuing political transition ... including drafting 
a constitution, holding a referendum and elections for a constitutionally 
elected government' (EU 2005). However, this was coupled with a statement 
expressing 'great concern over the deteriorating security situation in Iraq 
since the end of combat operations' (EU 2005). For international 
Arab/Muslim groups, gender equality and human rights took a back seat 
in comparison with they regarded to be the urgent task of securing Iraq's 
stability and avoiding regional repercussions. The Arab League has been 
staunchly opposed to the wording of the constitution, particularly to the 
references that limit links between Iraq and the community of Arab states. 
One League official stated that Arab diplomats are trying to convince Iraqi 
politicians 'to ensure that the Arabism of Iraq is stressed in the Iraqi 
constitution' (quoted in Al-Jazeera 2005). The League Secretary-General, 
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Amr Moussa, described it as a 'recipe for disaster', comments that followed 
up his earlier warning that attacking Iraq would 'open the gates of hell' in 
the region (quoted in Young 2005). 
However, Moussa's comments offered no constructive alternative path 
for the country. Indeed, Moussa and the Arab League are viewed with 
skepticism within Iraq due to their notable absence during the early phases 
of the constitutional formation process. The withdrawal of the Sunni 
delegation from the constitutional drafting process on 28 August seemed 
to vindicate the League's warnings. The Sunnis called for a more active 
involvement by the League in the run-up to the 15 October referendum 
where the UN helped make the League largely irrelevant (Al-Jazeera 
2005). In response, the League initiated a reconciliation conference to 
bridge the gap between the League and the emerging Iraqi leadership in 
the Governing Council. 3 
The OIC has been more restrained in its response, focusing on the need 
to formulate an inclusive document for the political restructuring of the 
country. It makes little reference to the prospective Islamic character of 
the charter, instead calling for the formation of a document that does not 
lead to the 'exclusion of any component of the population of Iraq from the 
process of decision-making on the future of the country' (OIC 2005). The 
OIC position represents a status quo stance in terms of not seeking to 
focus on the formation of the new Iraqi constitution as an opportunity to 
critically engage with the debate on Islam and IHR. Instead, it is concerned 
with stability in regards to an inclusive approach as the best way to avoid 
further disruption in the war-ravaged country. 
There has been an alternative critical response from the international 
arena. An-Na 'im has declared that the constitution 'is not a workable 
document ... (it has) brushed their differences under the carpet and crafted 
language that they could vote for. It's a time bomb that will explode as soon 
as its enacted' (quoted in WLUML 2005). This perspective is echoed from 
within Iraq by "liberal" Shi'ite cleric Iyad Jamal Din who claims that the 
constitution 'tries to preserve human rights, but within a choking religious 
society that is a clone of the Iranian system'. This will lead, he argues, to 
'a dark society controlled by extremists' (quoted in WLUML 2005). 
This differs from the statements of both the US administration and their 
representatives in Iraq. Former-US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad 
has stated that the constitution is laudable as a 'synthesis of Islamic traditions 
with the universal principles of democracy and human rights' (quoted in 
WLUML 2005). These sentiments were echoed by Bush himself when he 
stated that 'the constitution is one that honors women's rights and freedom 
of religion' (quoted in Pollitt 2005). Both Khalilzad and Bush's statements 
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are overly-optimistic when one examines the specific tensions in the 
document in terms of gender rights and religious freedom. There is no real 
"synthesis" of Islamic traditions with the international human rights 
regime as the constitution is too ambiguous. This ambiguity contains the 
seeds for future discord particularly in terms of the wide range of issues 
left untouched by the constitution. 
Gender equality and the new Iraqi constitution 
During the drafting process, tensions were rife between secularists, reformists 
(both moderate and radical), and conservative Islamists over gender rights 
in the constitution. The former group, represented by such organizations 
as the New Horizons for Women, an umbrella organization headed by 
Neba Hamid, the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq headed by 
Houzan Mahmoud, and the US-based Women's Alliance for a Democratic 
Iraq headed by Basma Fakri, sought either a removal of references to 
Islamic law or its substantial modification in the constitution.4 The latter, 
represented by such groups as the Muslim Women's Federation (Ittihad al-
Mar'a al-Muslima) headed by Mahdiya Abd al-Lami and Salama 
Sumaysim alongside prominent figures in religious, social and political 
organizations sought a traditionalist interpretation and application of 
shari'a (Al-Sarraj 2005). 
Therefore, the debate over gender issues in the Iraqi constitution largely 
centered on the role of Islam in the political life of the country. In particular, 
there was concern over whether the enshrinement of shari'a would 
'automatically deprive Iraqi women of their rights' (Al-Marashi 2005: 153). 
Ibrahim Al-Marashi5 has described this debate as somewhat alarmist in 
that whilst some elements of the new constitution may annul provisions of 
the 1959 Personal Status Law, other provisions work to enhance the rights 
of women (Al-Marashi 2005: 153-4). However, there is a danger in the 
removal of the previous personal status law as it had raised the ire of many 
conservative religious groups since its inception (Brown 2005b: 6). 
It is important to note that the constitution lacks specific provisions 
dealing with gender equality. However, there are a series of general provi-
sions that relate to gender rights in Iraq. First, Article 14 states that 'Iraqis 
are equal before the law without discrimination because of sex, ethnicity, 
nationality, origin, color, sect, belief, opinion or social or economic status'. 
Article 18 gives Iraqi women the right to pass their citizenship on to their 
children even if the father is not an Iraqi citizen. This provision was a victory 
for gender rights activists as it was not included in any previous Iraqi statute. 
However, there is no provision for Iraqi women to pass their citizenship on 
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to their husbands (Brown 2005: 7a). In addition to this specific measure, 
the constitution outlines general principles to enhance gender equality and 
women's participation in the political sphere. Article 20 states that 'citizens, 
male and female, have the right to participate in public matters and enjoy 
political rights, including the right to vote and run as candidates'. 
There was pressure to remove the quota system guaranteeing a 25 per 
cent female representation in the Iraqi parliament, first enshrined in the 
TAL, from the constitution. However, pressure from a variet)r of women's 
rights groups prevented this from taking place. This has come through in 
Article 48 which seeks to promote the inclusion of women in the political 
structure of the country whereby the 'elections law aims at achieving 
a representation percentage of women that is not less than one quarter of 
the council's members'. Another controversial area where activist groups 
achieved success was the inclusion of provision seeking to outlaw 
domestic violence. Not included in either the TAL of earlier drafts, Article 
29 states that 'violence and abuse in the family, school and society shall 
be forbidden'. This was the first time that domestic violence was criminalized 
in Iraq. 
Despite these provisions, the constitution lacks specific mechanisms to 
ensure full protection of gender equality as stated in the UDHR. The draft 
makes no mention of the 1959 law, instead referring to the settling of 
matters in line with the religious beliefs of each community (Pollitt 2005). 
Article 39 is at the heart of the controversy. It states that 'Iraqis are free in 
their adherence to their personal status according to their own religion, 
sect, belief and choice, and that will be organized by law'. The constitution 
does not explicitly do away with the 1959 Personal Status Law but it 
allows for the application of sectarian law in relation to issues of personal 
status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and various judicial matters. 
This has been seen as a dangerous trajectory for gender rights in Iraq as 
the use of "sectarian law" within communities promotes the possibility of 
arbitrary imposition of retroactive laws against women. Article 39 is 
a rewording of Article 14 of the earlier draft constitution that stated 'personal 
status shall be included in the law in accordance with the religion and the 
sect of the person' (Brown 2005a: 5). Both Articles, including the tempered 
Article 39, undermine the enshrinement of universal personal status contained 
in the 1959 Personal Status Law bode ill for the position of Iraqi women's 
rights. A former member of the constitutional panel and leading Iraqi 
academic, Professor Suha Azzawi has stated that 'Iraqi women will lose 
so much if this constitution is passed' (quoted in WLUML 2005). 
Brown argues that instead of a single code for all personal status law in 
Iraq, the constitution now offers a "menu of choices' depending on 'religion, 
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sect, belief and choice' (Brown 2005b: 6). There is an assumption that if 
citizens choose to act according to the provisions of the 1959 law, they 
would be able to as it is not abrogated. However, as the law is outlined largely 
in communal rather than individual terms, the pressure to act according to 
the status law of each community is likely to be great, particularly in rural 
areas. In addition, the ambiguity of personal status in Iraq is compounded 
by the lack of lucidity surrounding what judicial system will implement 
personal status law. There is no clarity in terms of whether the state will 
be responsible for the establishment of separate court systems for each 
community or whether this will be the responsibility of the community 
leaders. There is also no clarity in terms of whether a citizen can select 
different provisions from different codes and how disputes are to be settled 
if disputants claim to be working under different personal status codes. 
Brown has noted that these very problems are what led many Middle 
Eastern states to initially adopt uniform Personal Status Laws even in the 
face of charges of encroaching on religious freedoms (Brown 2005b: 7). 
In its efforts to accommodate all groups, the constitution has created 
further confusion for the status of women in the complexity of Iraqi 
society, a far more intricate mixture than the Shi' a-Sunni Aralr--Kurd 
trichotomy. ~ 
The debate between the different positions on this provision highlights 
the divisiveness of this Article, and how the traditionalist groups have 
succeeded in implementing their vision for personal status in Iraq over the 
radical reformists. For instance, the traditionalist Muslim Women's 
Federation countered the reformist demands as contradictory to Islam. 
Head of the Federation, MahdiyaAbd al-Lami stated that the group sought 
to pursue 'justice, not equality' (Al-Sarraj 2005). This position was 
premised on the contention that if primacy was given to gender equality in 
personal status through the constitution then women would lose their 
ability to act in their designated roles in the family. The focus on the main-
tenance of the family structure (Article 29) where the state is to 'preserve 
its (the family's) existence and ethical and religious value' buttresses this 
contention. Another member of the Muslim Women's Federation, Salama 
Sumaysim, has taken a more conciliatory tone by acknowledging the 
misuse of Islamic law over the years to promote patriarchal structures in 
Islamic societies. However, the parameters for the 'dialogue' that 
Sumaysim calls for have shifted due to the imposition of sectarian law 
(Al-Sarraj 2005). 
The formal promotion of women in public institutions, formal equality 
in personal status law as well as protection from the arbitrariness of 
sectarian law are key factors in any democratic society. These safeguards 
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are especially important in Iraq since women constitute 60 per cent of the 
population due to successive wars (Fakri 2005). Yet, the constitution of 
post-Saddam Iraq falls short of those human rights yardsticks. This shortfall 
is partly due to the minimal role of women's lobby groups, especially 
those with liberal leanings, in the drafting of the new constitution. This 
enraged groups like the Iraqi Women's Movement which accused 
'prominent Iraqi political forces' of deliberately neglecting women in the 
constitutional draft (Al-Marashi 2005: 154). • 
Indeed, during the drafting process, there was a manipulation of the 
quota system whereby existing male members of the Provisional Authority 
were designated the responsibility of choosing women to sit on the draft-
ing committee. It was argued by leading women's rights activists in an open 
letter to Ambassador Bremer that women who were chosen to fill the 
quotas were those whom they 'knew they could intimidate and control' 
(National Council ofWomen's Organizations 2003). 6 In addition, the quota 
system fell short of requiring the appointment of women to key institu-
tional positions in the judiciary, the executive, as well as in the ministry. 
Basma Fakri has articulated the core of these concerns from the per-
spective of the radical reformist group (Tully 2005). In particular, there 
are concerns in terms of the application of personal status provisions 
within sectarian law. Despite this, these groups do not seek the removal of 
references to Islamic law in Iraqi political life where 'Iraqi women are not 
opposing Islam' (Fakri 2005). Fakri argues that Islam is a 'great source 
and guide for inspiration' for all Muslim Iraqi men and women, but 
Islamic law must be utilized as 'one among many sources' administering 
gender rights in post-Saddam Iraq (Fakri 2005). Iraq is a signatory to a 
number of international treaties affecting gender rights, including the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR treaties. The constitution does not 
refute these commitments. But references to sectarian and Islamic law 
make Iraq's adherence to these international treaties problematic. 
Religious freedom and the new Iraqi constitution 
Similar to the tensions concerning the issue of gender equality issues 
surrounding religious freedom proved highly complex during the consti-
tutional drafting process. Again, Islam and its role in the political life 
of post-Saddam Iraq was at the heart of this complication. The issue of 
religious freedom affects all of Iraq's confessional and ethnic communities. 
Outside the dominant Shi' a, Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities, Iraq 
has a significant Turkoman population who are largely Sunni but also include 
a smaller number of Shi' a groups. In addition also Iraq has diminutive but 
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long-standing Catholic and Christian communities, the largest of which 
are the Chaldean community as well as the Syrian Catholics and Syrian 
Orthodox, Armenian Catholics and Protestants, along with smaller groups 
constituting 3-5 per cent of the total population. In addition to these 
groups, Iraq also has an ancient Sabaen-Mandean community in addition 
to the Yezidi community around the city of Mosul. 
The Turkmen have historically been excluded from the political process 
in Iraq. In 1977 the Ba'ath regime allowed only Arab and Kurdish nationality 
to be registered in the national census. The 1990 constitution stated that 
the 'Iraqi people are Arabs and Kurds only'. This echoed patterns of 
exclusion as early as 1958 where the post-independence constitution 
stated, 'the Arabs and the Kurds are the participants in the homeland'. 
Only in 1997, the Turkmen were allowed to register as 'New Arabs'. 
The post-Saddam political system has done little to address the need to 
recognize and include the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq. The new 
constitution echoes the 1958 constitution in focusing on the Arabs and 
Kurds as the only constituents of Iraq. Those provisions in the Interim 
Constitution that allowed for education in minority languages (particularly 
Turkmen) have been abrogated by the enforcement of Kurdish dominance 
in the north. This has been particularly notable in Kirkuk. The Mandaean 
community was left without a representative in the constitutional drafting 
committee but had a committee member appointed along with 15 Sunni 
members on 5 July 2005 (ICGb 2005: 2). For the other groups, they sought 
to ally themselves with the various lists in the elections. For instance, 
'the Yezidis . . . ran on the Kurdish list' whilst the 'representatives of the 
Christian/ Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac and Armenian communities predom-
inant in the north either ran on their own (small) lists ... Sunni Turkomans 
had their own list, whilst Shi'ite Turkomans joined the United Iraqi Alliance' 
(ICGb 2005: 2). 
The constitution led to mixed results for the religious communities and 
the enshrinement of rights. The position of Islam as 'a basic source of 
legislation' where 'no law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed 
rules of Islam' (Article 2) was tempered with the declaration that 'the full 
religious rights for all individuals and the freedom of creed and religious 
practices of people like Christians, Yezidis, and Mandaean Sabaens' shall 
be protected (Article 2). This was an important concession when placed in 
relation to the controversial Article 3 9 which allowed personal status law 
to be organized by each community. Thus, community groups appear to 
have gained supremacy over personal self-determination. Despite this, 
efforts to undermine the unity of the Christian and other minority position in 
the drafting process overshadowed these concessions for religious freedom. 
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There was much consternation amongst the Iraqi Christian community 
concerning Article 122 which declared the Chaldean and Assyrian 
communities as separate. This article enshrined a formal division in the 
community. This has been controversial as, in October 2003, the leaders 
of the various Christian communities in Iraq met at the 'Chaldean Syriac 
Assyrian Conference' in Baghdad where they agreed on the use of the 
label ChaldoAssyrian to refer to the entire community (AINA 2005; Naby 
2005: 1). This was done so that the community would have a stronger 
bargaining position in any future negotiations on the political future of 
Iraq such as the constitutional drafting process. 
The core issues for the ChaldoAssyrian community in this have been to 
strengthen their status in relation to their position in Kirkuk. However, the 
Kurdish leaders, particularly the KDP, have been active in seeking to 
promote division within the ChaldoAssyrian community and due to their 
high degree of control over the constitutional drafting process, they were 
able to undercut the ChaldoAssyrian community's attempt at formal political 
unity. Whilst Article 122 appears to be a concession to the ChaldoAssyrian 
community, it is in fact a move to undermine the community's unity 
through a formal enshrinement of division (see AINA 2005). 
Another critical issue is the question of apostasy. Article 7 takes an 
important step through the criminalization of entities or trends that 
advocate, instigate, justify, or propagate racism, terrorism, (and) talifir 
(declaring someone an infidel). Yet, the constitution says nothing 
about the right to choose one's own religion. Religious freedom, including 
the freedom of choice in religion, has traditionally been lacking in the 
Middle East and the new Iraqi constitution does not move beyond 
generalities to protect it. 
Adherence to Islam has traditionally been seen as a cornerstone of 
national identity and ruling regimes have exploited this presumed connection 
for political gains (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 105-7). The issue of religious 
freedom, in this respect, is highly important as it can be used for these 
alternative means as it has been in other Islamic societies and states 
(Saeed & Saeed 2004: 107). In a similar manner, the adoption of a secular 
lifestyle has been seen by some Muslims as 'an indirect "Christianization" 
of their societies', particularly through the influence of a globalized 
Western culture (Saeed & Saeed 2004: 109; Sadri & Sadri 2000: 160-2). 
This rejection of the West also extends to criticisms of democracy in the 
Muslim world where support for such political models is seen as tacit 
support of Western dominance. Consequently, supporters of democracy 
are accused of apostasy by radical Islamic groups. Indeed, for many Muslims 
the issue of apostasy is closely linked to the Western colonization of 
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Muslim lands. The process of colonization brought with it concerted 
attempts to spread Christianity leading to fears that Islam was under 
attack. Harsh punishments for apostasy have been a response to this fear 
(Saeed & Saeed 2004: 117). 
The post-Saddam constitution does not allow for charges of apostasy 
against Muslim groups. The constitution does not lay down a strict inter-
pretation of Islam (Sunni or Shi' a, Isma'ili or Mu'tazili) that can provoke 
the imposition of apostasy punishments for other Muslim sects. However, 
there is no effort to address the other area of controversy where a Muslim 
may seek to leave the faith. This is an area covered by the UDHR but not 
by the more "conventional" or "traditionalist" views on Islam and human 
rights, such as the Cairo Declaration. There are vague provisions in the 
new constitution that seem to hold out the possibility of separate courts for 
each religious community (Pollitt 2005). This is a major concern as it 
implies the application of religious law to all within a specific community, 
even if they are secular. It also threatens to roll back common law applicable 
to the entire population. 
Conclusion 
The removal not only of a regime but of an entire state structure represents 
a new course in US foreign policy. In doing this, the United States, along 
with its coalition partners, the UN, as well as all regional and global 
bodies have an obligation to the Iraqi people to ensure that the new political 
structures introduced enable a constructive, pluralist, and peaceful future. 
An essential element of this is an engagement with the issue of human 
rights for the Iraqi people and its protection in the new constitution. 
The new Iraqi constitution is a compromised document. It was put 
together by an unlikely group of people with widely different agendas, all 
of whom had their ethnic/sectarian interests to protect. These competing 
interests collided at the intersection of Islam/human rights and the result 
was a compromise deal that included some aspects from the competing 
programs of every delegation, without satisfying any of them completely. 
The constitution, whilst making important progress, is in real danger of 
reverting into a traditionalist understanding of the relationship between 
Islam and human rights. This is particularly pronounced in relation to the 
issue of gender rights where universal personal status laws can be replaced 
with the laws of particular sectarian communities with minimal government 
oversight. Religious freedom stands in a stronger position, particularly in 
terms of limits on the use of apostasy injunctions against Iraqi Muslims 
and non-Muslims. 
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Notes 
1 Iraq's disarmament obligations refer to UNSCRs 660, 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 
715, 986 and 1284. 
2 At the time of the invasion, the US and UK were joined by 46 other states in the coalition 
as 'publicly committed' partners. 
3 The reconciliation conference took place between 19-21 November in Cairo and went 
some way to re-establish the relevance of the Arab League in terms of influence over the 
situation in Iraq. 
4 The New Horizons for Women (www.ihcenter.org/groups/nhfw), the Organization of 
Women's Freedom in Iraq (www.equalityiniraq.com) and Women's Alliance for a 
Democratic Iraq (www.wafdi.org). 
5 Ibrahim Al-Marashi was the author of 'Iraq's Security & Intelligence Network: A Guide 
& Analysis', the article from which the Blair government plagiarized to compile their 
'intelligence dossier' as justification for invasion. 
6 This letter was signed by Dr. Maha Al Sakban (Secretary, Diwanyiah Women's 
Association), Sawan Al Barrak (President, Hillah Women's Association [also called 
Fatima Zahra Women's Rights Association]), Bahija Mahdi (President, Karbala 
Women's Association), Dunia Kareem (Coordinator, Al Kut Women's Association), 
Rabab Mahmud (Coordinator, Najaf Women's Association), Salah Muhsen (male) 
(Chair, Hillah Human Rights Association), Asaad Fadhil (male) (Chair, Human Rights 
and Democracy Center in Diwaniyah), Muhanad Al Kinani (male) (Chair, Human 
Rights Watch in Karbala), Ali Al Shaibani, (male) (Chair, Human Rights and Democracy 
Center in Najaf), Ala Talabani (High Council for Iraqi Women, Co-founder), Lina Abood 
(Al Nahda Association) and Hadil Hassan Kudeir (Iraqi Women's League). 
